Mercer Law Review
Volume 63
Number 1 Annual Survey of Georgia Law

Article 19

12-2011

Workers' Compensation
H. Michael Bagley
J. Benson Wood

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr
Part of the Workers' Compensation Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Bagley, H. Michael and Wood, J. Benson (2011) "Workers' Compensation," Mercer Law Review: Vol. 63 :
No. 1 , Article 19.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr/vol63/iss1/19

This Survey Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Mercer Law School Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Mercer Law Review by an authorized editor of Mercer Law School
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact repository@law.mercer.edu.

Workers' Compensation
by H. Michael Bagley*
and J. Benson Ward"
The 2010-2011 survey period' featured decisions of Georgia appellate
courts in areas ranging from medical care to intervening accidents, with
no significant legislation impacting the Workers' Compensation Act.2
I.

SUSPENSION OF BENEFITS

S & B Engineers & Constructors Ltd. v. Bolden,' reinforced the
longstanding principle requiring proper notice to the claimant of the
The claimant sustained a
basis for the suspension of benefits.'
compensable injury to her left hand in June 2006 and began receiving
temporary total disability (TTD) benefits. After her doctor reported that
she could return to work with some restrictions in March 2007, the
insurer unilaterally suspended indemnity benefits without notice on
April 24, 2007. The claimant filed a hearing request seeking reinstatement of benefits plus penalties and attorney fees.' The administrative
law judge (ALJ) determined that the claimant was no longer disabled as
of April 9, 2007, but awarded an additional ten days of temporary total
disability benefits based upon the employer's failure to provide the ten
* Partner in the firm of Drew, EckI & Farnham, LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Emory
University (B.A., 1977); University of Georgia School of Law (J.D., 1980). Member, State
Bar of Georgia.
** Associate in the firm of Drew, Eck1 & Farnham, LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. University
of Georgia (B.A., summa cum laude, 2002); University of Georgia School of Law (J.D., cum
laude, 2005). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. For analysis of Georgia workers' compensation law during the prior survey period,
see H. Michael Bagley & J. Benson Ward, Workers' Compensation, Annual Survey of
Georgia Law, 62 MERCER L. REV. 383 (2010).

2. O.C.G.A. tit. 34, ch. 9 (2008 & Supp. 2011).
3. 304 Ga. App. 534, 697 S.E.2d 260 (2010).
4. Id. at 539, 697 S.E.2d at 263.
5. Id. at 535, 697 S.E.2d at 261.
6. Id. Although claimant originally sought total temporary disability beginning April
24, 2007, she amended her request, as she began working another job on May 9, 2008. Id.
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day notice of suspension via a WC-2 form. The ALJ also awarded a late
payment penalty and attorney fees but denied the claimant's request for
an assessment of civil penalties.'
The claimant appealed to the Appellate Division of the Workers'
Compensation Board (board), which found the claimant had no actual or
constructive knowledge of the suspension and thus awarded her benefits
through the date of the hearing plus a late payment penalty, but no
assessed attorney fees or civil penalties.8 Both parties appealed to the
Superior Court of Chatham County, Georgia, which affirmed the
appellate division's award, and the parties again filed cross appeals.
The Georgia Court of Appeals noted the mandatory language in section
34-9-221(i) of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.),o
requiring the employer to file a WC-2 with the board and provide the
employee with notice." While technical violations of the statute, such
as providing less than ten days notice or stating the incorrect reason for
suspension, will not prevent the employer/insurer from arguing that
benefits are not due, they will subject the employer/insurer to potential
liability for attorney fees.12 The court distinguished those situations
from the present case, where, as opposed to making a simple technical
error in filling out the WC-2, the employer/insurer failed to file a WC-2
and provided no explanation for this failure.13 The court did not
determine whether constructive knowledge of the reason for suspension
would relieve the employer/insurer of complying with the statute because
there was no evidence in this case of any actual or constructive notice."
7. Id. at 536, 697 S.E.2d at 261.
8. Id. at 536-37, 697 S.E.2d at 261-62. The employer/insurer did not correct its
violation of O.C.G.A § 34-9-221(i) and board Rule 221(i) until the hearing, so the appellate
division determined that the AL committed error by limiting claimant's award to only ten
days. Id. at 536, 697 S.E.2d at 261-62. In addition, the appellate division determined
that, because the claimant did not have knowledge of the reason behind the suspension,
she was entitled to benefits from the suspension date, April 23, 2007, until the hearing
date, July 23, 2008, and a 15% penalty. Id. at 536-37, 697 S.E.2d at 262.
9. Id. at 534-35, 697 S.E.2d at 260-61.
10. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-221(i) (2008).
11. S & B Eng'rs & ConstructorsLtd., 304 Ga. App. at 537, 697 S.E.2d at 262.
12. Id. at 538, 697 S.E.2d at 262-63 (quoting Reliance Elec. Co. v. Brightwell, 284 Ga.
App. 235, 238, 643 S.E.2d 742, 745 (2007)); see, e.g., Sadie G. Mays Mem. Nursing Home
v. Freeman, 163 Ga. App. 557, 559-60, 292 S.E.2d 340, 342-43 (1982) (reversing both the
superior court's and appellate division's rulings that the employer did not show a proper
termination of benefits when it incorrectly stated its reasoning behind the termination on
the WC-2); Reliance Elec., 284 Ga. App. at 239-40, 643 S.E.2d at 745 (reversing an award
of benefits before the date of the hearing when the WC-2 form had only been filed a few
days late).
13. S & B Eng'rs & Constructors Ltd., 304 Ga. App. at 538, 697 S.E.2d at 263.
14. Id. at 540, 697 S.E.2d at 264.
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The court thus affirmed the award of temporary total disability benefits
until the claimant found new employment on May 9, 2008, and reversed
the portion of the decision awarding benefits from May 9, 2008, to the
date of the hearing on July 23, 2008.15
In reviewing the claimant's cross appeal, the court of appeals held
there was no error in the appellate division's factual findings and
holdings regarding the compensability of her carpal tunnel syndrome,
the decision not to award her additional attorney fees, and the determination that the employer/insurer did not have to produce certain
documents and correspondence requested by the claimant. 6
II. REDUCTION OF BENEFITS
In Imerys Kaolin, Inc. v. Blackshear," the court of appeals addressed
the procedural requirements for unilaterally reducing temporary total
disability (TTD) benefits to temporary partial disability (TPD) benefits.
Here, the claimant sustained a compensable injury to both of his hands
in 2001 and began receiving TTD benefits. The authorized treating
physician (ATP) released him to return to light-duty work on June 11,
2001, and in January 2002, the employer/insurer informed the claimant
that his TTD benefits would be reduced to TPD benefits as of June 4,
2002. Instead of reducing the claimant's benefits in 2002, the employer/insurer obtained a new light-duty release from the ATP, dated
December 31, 2002, and based on an August 2002 evaluation. Based on
this new release, the employer/insurer notified the claimant in January
2003, that his benefits would be reduced on December 31, 2003. The
employer/insurer actually reduced the claimant's benefits to TPD in
January 2004, and in February 2008, it suspended TPD benefits because
the 350-week cap had been reached."
The claimant requested a
hearing, arguing the employer/insurer did not provide timely notice of
the unilateral reduction under O.C.G.A. § 34-9-104(a)(2)," and,
therefore, the reduction was improper.2 o
The ALJ found that the employer/insurer had a duty to notify the
claimant of the reduction within sixty days of June 11, 2001, and due to
the failure to notify, "the ALJ reinstated [the claimant's] TTD benefits
back to the date of the unilateral reduction in January 2004."21

15.

Id.

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id. at 540-41, 697 S.E.2d at 264-65.
306 Ga. App. 491, 702 S.E.2d 440 (2010).
Id. at 491-92, 702 S.E.2d at 441-42.
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-104(aX2) (2008).
Imerys Kaolin, Inc., 306 Ga. App. at 492, 702 S.E.2d at 442.

21.

Id.
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The appellate division agreed with the ALJ on all but one point, stating
generally that a new release based on a subsequent examination would
bring about a new sixty-day period during which a WC-104 might be
filed.22 The Superior Court of Twiggs County, Georgia, reinstated all
of the conclusions and findings reached by the ALJ and further held that
the employer/insurer's failure to file a WC-104 within sixty days of the
initial release precluded it from filing a subsequent WC-104 "unless and
until there was a change in [the claimant's] status.""
The court of appeals first addressed the superior court's additional
holding requiring a change in status before filing a subsequent WC-104,
reversing it as an incorrect interpretation of the statute.2 ' The court
of appeals held that the employer/insurer's WC-104 "notice [was] invalid,
not because it [was] similar to a previous notice, but because it was
issued more than [sixty] days from the time the restrictions were 'determined'" by an examination.25 The statute and board rules require that
the notice be sent within sixty days of examination, as opposed to within
sixty days of an affirmation of a prior determination.
III.

PREAUTHORIZATION OF MEDICAL CARE

The Georgia Court of Appeals addressed the impact and scope of the
WC-205 board form this year and determined the board had exceeded its
rule-making authority in a decision that has since been affirmed by the
Georgia Supreme Court.
In Selective HR Solutions v. Mulligan,"
the claimant initially injured her back at work in September 2005,
received treatment, and returned to work in July 2006. In May 2007,
she reinjured her back while at home and, after seeing several doctors,
she returned to the ATP from the 2005 injury. The ATP determined
that surgery was necessary and sent a WC-205 form to the employer/insurer, requesting preauthorization. More than one month later, the
employer/insurer returned the form and refused to authorize the surgery
without a second opinion, and, three days later, the ATP performed
surgery."

22. Id. at 492-93, 702 S.E.2d at 442.
23. Id. at 493, 702 S.E.2d at 442.
24. Id. at 494, 702 S.E.2d at 443.
25. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
26. Id. The notice came approximately five months after the last medical evaluation
and over four months after the functional capacity evaluation (FCE), and thus did not fall
within the requisite time period. Id.
27. Selective HR Solutions v. Mulligan, 305 Ga. App. 147, 151, 699 S.E.2d 119, 123
(2010), affd, No. S1061899, 2011 WL 4532528 (Ga. Oct. 3, 2011).
28. 305 Ga. App. 147, 699 S.E.2d 119 (2010).
29. Id. at 148-49, 699 S.E.2d at 121.
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The AL denied her claim for benefits, finding the claimant had not
shown a change in condition from her original injury and that she had
not proven the recent back surgery was compensable, and the board
affirmed.ao The Superior Court of Bibb County, Georgia affirmed with
respect to the change in condition issue, but with respect to the issue
regarding preauthorization of medical treatment pursuant to Rule
205,1 the court reversed.32 The superior court held that the employer/insurer's failure to respond to the WC-205 form within five days
automatically triggered the obligation for the employer to pay for the
medical care. Both parties appealed.
The employer/insurer argued that Board Rule 205's language,
providing that the failure to respond to a WC-205 request within five
days results in preapproval of the required procedure, must be read in
conjunction with O.C.G.A. § 34-9-200(a)' and Rule 205(bXl), 35 which
"provide that [the] employee is entitled to medical benefits only when
[such benefitsi relatell to an 'on the job injury.""' Because the board's
rule-making authority is limited, the court examined whether a rule
altering the burden of proof as to compensability in favor of the claimant
is procedural or substantive, concluding that such a burden-shifting rule
is substantive." The court concluded that, to the extent Rule 205
precludes the employer/insurer from contesting the compensability of
treatment, the Rule "is invalid as substantive rule-making which
impermissibly shifts the claimant's burden" to prove an injury is workrelated." The court noted that "[tihe [bloard may [still] assess civil
penalties and attorney fees for [the employer/insurer's] failure to timely
respond to a [WC-2051 request . .. where compensability of treatment is
not in issue."" The court of appeals affirmed the ruling, stating that
the claimant did not prove a work-related change in condition.40 The

30. Id. at 149, 699 S.E.2d at 121.
31. O.C.G.A. § 34 app. r. 205 (Supp. 2011).
32. Selective HR Solutions, 305 Ga. App. at 149, 699 S.E.2d at 121.
33. Id. at 147-49, 699 S.E.2d at 120-22.
34. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-200(a) (2008).
35. O.C.G.A. § 34 app. r. 205(bXl) (2010).
36. Selective HR Solutions, 305 Ga. App. at 150, 699 S.E.2d at 122.
37. Id. at 150-51, 699 S.E.2d at 122 (noting that claimant in workers' compensation
case has burden of proof to show his or her injury compensable).
38. Id. at 151, 699 S.E.2d at 123.
39. Id. at 151 n.1, 699 S.E.2d at 123 n.1.
40. Id. at 148, 699 S.E.2d at 121.
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Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals decision on October
3, 2011.41
IV.

INTERVENING ACCIDENT

Causation is normally a question of fact rather than law, and when
the board's findings are supported by any evidence, they may not be
altered on appeal.4 2 In Lowndes County Board of Commissioners v.
Connell," the claimant injured his right knee in 2005 while executing
a warrant, was diagnosed as having bursitis, and immediately returned
to work. He injured the same knee in 2006 while executing another
warrant and continued to work and meet all work and training
requirements of his physically demanding job. In May 2007, the
claimant injured his right knee while riding a four-wheeler at his home,
resulting in a torn anterior cruciate ligament (ACL) and cartilage
damage that necessitated surgery. He filed a workers' compensation
claim seeking payment of his medical expenses and temporary total
disability benefits, arguing in the alternative that either the tear was
actually caused by the earlier work-related injury, the 2007 accident was
a new accident brought on by gradual worsening due to work duties, or
the new injury constituted a superadded injury."
The ALJ determined the torn ACL was causally connected to the 2006
work-related accident and awarded medical expenses for treatment of
that condition, but denied the claim for medical expenses resulting from
the torn cartilage and for disability benefits for time missed following
the 2007 accident. Both parties appealed. On appeal, the appellate
division agreed with the denial of medical expenses for the torn cartilage
and disability benefits, but reversed the decision with respect to the torn
ACL. The Superior Court of Lowndes County, Georgia, agreed with the
ALJ's decisions and concluded the appellate division erred in its partial
reversal.4 5
In first examining whether the torn ACL was connected with the 2006
accident, the court of appeals concluded that some evidence existed to
support the appellate division's finding that the torn ACL resulted from

41. Selective HR Solutions v. Mulligan, No. S1061899, 2011 WL 4532528 (Ga. Oct. 3,
2011).
42. Lowndes Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs v. Connell, 305 Ga. App. 844, 844-45, 701 S.E.2d
227, 228-29 (2010) (quoting DeKalb Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. Singleton, 294 Ga. App. 96, 96,
668 S.E.2d 767, 767 (2008)).
43. 305 Ga. App. 844, 701 S.E.2d 227 (2010).
44. Id. at 845-46, 701 S.E.2d at 229.
45. Id. at 847-48, 701 S.E.2d at 230.
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the 2007 four-wheeler incident and not the 2006 accident. In light of
the claimant's burden of proving causation and the conflicting evidence
presented by the parties, the court determined the finding was
justified. Turning to examine whether the torn ACL was compensable
as a new accident resulting from the deterioration of his knee over time
due to work, the court again cited the conflicting evidence as support for
the appellate division to conclude the torn ACL was a distinct injury
caused solely by the 2007 incident rather than by gradual deterioration
of his knee condition due to the job.48 Finally, the court of appeals
agreed that the torn cartilage was not a compensable superadded injury
as the elements for a superadded injury had not been met because the
underlying disability, a torn ACL, was not work related. 49 Because
neither the torn ACL nor the torn cartilage were compensable injuries,
the claimant was not entitled to indemnity benefits. 0
V.

JUDIcIAL REVIEW: THE ANY EVIDENCE RULE

The court of appeals dealt with a number of cases involving judicial
review and the standard of review on appeal during this survey period.
In Brannon v. Garcia," the court of appeals confirmed the limited
authority of the superior court with respect to a workers' compensation
award.52 In Brannon, the claimant filed a claim against "Brennan
Roofing Company," no employer appeared at the subsequent hearing,
and the ALJ awarded "Brennan Roofing Company" to pay benefits.
The claimant filed a "Petition to Adopt, Modify, and Enforce Order" with
the Superior Court of Floyd County, Georgia, to enforce the award and
styled the petition as "Daniel Garcia, Employee v. Brennan Roofing Co.
[sic] Brannon Roofing Co., Employer, and Gary Brannon, Company
Owner."' 4 After the superior court made the award an order of the
court, the claimant filed a motion "to correct a scrivener's error" by
changing the name of the employer in the board's award from "Brennan
Roofing Company" to "Brannon Roofing Company," and a separate
motion to add Gary Brannon as a party defendant." The superior

46.
47.
48.
49.
Cnty.,
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

See id. at 848, 701 S.E.2d at 231.
Id. at 848, 701 S.E.2d at 230-31.
Id. at 849, 701 S.E.2d at 231.
Id. at 849-50, 701 S.E.2d at 232 (quoting Baugh-Carroll v. Hosp. Auth. of Randolph
248 Ga. App. 591, 594, 545 S.E.2d 690, 694 (2001)).
Id. at 850, 701 S.E.2d at 232.
307 Ga. App. 69, 703 S.E.2d 669 (2010).
Id. at 70-71, 703 S.E.2d at 670.
Id. at 70, 703 S.E.2d at 670.
Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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court granted both of claimant's motions, and Gary Brannon appealed."
The court of appeals agreed that the superior court exceeded its
authority by modifying the award to add a party and change the
employer's name." The court explained that the authority of the
superior court is limited to enforcement of the final award, and the court
could not add a party or alter the named employer in the award.s" The
claimant's proper venue for requesting these changes was with the state
board."
In Hughston Orthopedic Hospital v. Wilson,"o the claimant, a hospital
employee, allegedly became sick from fumes while working on a floor
where the hospital was installing new wallpaper. When she was unable
to breathe due to the fumes, she was taken to the emergency room,
fainted, and was admitted to the hospital for monitoring and care. She
alleged that when she awoke, she was unable to walk or talk due to
brain injury. However, a series of hospital tests revealed normal brain
functioning. After leaving the hospital, she did not return to work, but
instead saw several doctors, all of whom determined she had normal
brain functioning, except for a doctor to whom her attorney referred her
and who did not conduct any tests. The claimant subsequently filed a
workers' compensation claim against the employer/insurer."
In describing the claimant's demeanor while testifying at the hearing,
the ALJ noted that, at times, the claimant appeared to feign a stutter,
talked like a baby, spoke in a high-pitched tone, and appeared to speak
in tongues.6 2 The ALJ concluded that, while it was possible the
claimant suffered a "temporary adverse reaction to the wallpaper
chemicals, she had failed to prove ... that her persistent symptoms and
problems . . . were caused by a work-related chemical exposure." The
appellate division affirmed, but the Superior Court of Muscogee County,
Georgia, reversed on grounds that the appellate division had misinterpreted the evidence before the court and improperly substituted one
nonexpert opinion, its own opinion, for that of the medical experts.6
On appeal, the employer/insurer argued error by the superior court
due to the reversal of the appellate division in light of the any evidence

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 69-70, 703 S.E.2d at 669-70.
Id. at 70, 703 S.E.2d at 670.
Id. at 70-71, 703 S.E.2d at 670.
Id. at 71, 703 S.E.2d at 670.
306 Ga. App. 893, 703 S.E.2d 17 (2010).
Id. at 894, 703 S.E.2d at 18-19.
Id. at 894-95, 703 S.E.2d at 19.
Id. at 895, 703 S.E.2d at 19.
Id.
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standard of review that was to be applied." The court of appeals
agreed, noting that factual questions are properly left to the state board
rather than the superior court." The court stated that "there was some
evidence to support the [appellate division's] determination that [the
claimant's] condition was not caused by a work-related chemical
exposure," and it is properly the province of the trier of fact, the board,
to weigh the credibility of witnesses, including expert witnesses, and
reach a conclusion where facts contradict each other." The court of
appeals reversed the superior court's decision because it determined that
the court "improperly substituted itself as the fact-finder in lieu of the
[s]tate [bloard.""
In Home Depot v. McCreary," the claimant sustained a closed head
injury in 2001 when a co-worker dropped a sheet of plywood that struck
her on her eyebrow. She returned to work the next day and did not file
a workers' compensation claim; however, she began experiencing
cognitive difficulties necessitating medical attention and eventually
concluded that her problems resulted from her 2001 injury. In January
2002, she sustained a compensable neck injury at work, ultimately quit
working in June 2003 for disputed reasons, and began receiving
temporary total disability benefits for the 2002 injury in July 2003.70
Eventually, the claimant filed for benefits for her head injury, "contending she suffered a 'fictional new injury' when her symptoms became so
bad she had to stop working in June 2003."n7 She later filed a claim for
the 2001 incident and joined this claim with the claim for the fictional
new injury.7

The ALJ granted her medical benefits for the 2001 injury but did not
address the fictional new injury issue or the claim for income benefits,
which were from June 2003, until her receipt of benefits in July 2003 for
the 2002 neck injury. The appellate division reversed the ALJ, finding
that the statute of limitations had run on the first injury and that no
evidence supported the claim that working aggravated her head

65. Id.
66. Id. at 895, 703 S.E.2d at 19-20 (quoting City of Atlanta v. Roach, 297 Ga. App. 408,
411, 667 S.E.2d 426, 429 (2009)).
67. Id. at 895-96, 703 S.E.2d at 20.
68. Id. at 897, 703 S.E.2d at 21.
69. 306 Ga. App. 805, 703 S.E.2d 392 (2010).
70. Id. at 809, 703 S.E.2d at 395-96.
71. Id. at 809, 703 S.E.2d at 396.
72. Id. At the hearing, claimant "conceded that the statute had run on her 2001 injury,
and argued instead that her continued employment aggravated her 2001 work-related head
injury until she became unable to work in June 2003." Id.
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injury." The Superior Court of Oconee County Georgia set aside the
appellate division's latter conclusion and remanded for consideration of
the conflicting evidence in the record and "for clarification as to whether
the doctrine of aggravation of a preexisting condition was considered."7 4
The court of appeals first disposed of the employer/insurer's contention
that neither the appellate division nor the superior court had subject
matter jurisdiction to consider whether the claimant sustained a fictional
new injury in 2003 because the claimant did not cross appeal the ALJ's
award." After discussing the legislature's 1994 rewriting of O.C.G.A.
§ 34-9-103(a)" to remove the appellate division's ability to hear
additional evidence, the court framed the issue before the appellate
division as whether the ALJ properly ruled on the injury date, 2001
versus 2003, which fell within the scope of the board's subject matter
jurisdiction." The court further explained that the employer/insurer
failed to raise this jurisdictional argument, although it had ample
opportunity to do so, despite the employer/insurer's argument to the
contrary.78
The court then addressed the employer/insurer's argument that the
superior court erroneously vacated the appellate division's award when
some evidence supported the decision.79 The court noted that "erroneous applications of law to undisputed facts ... are subject to the de novo
standard of review" by the superior court.80 Here, the superior court
did not weigh the evidence but simply found that the appellate division
was mistaken in holding that no evidence showed an aggravation; thus,
the award contained an undisputed statement of fact necessitating a
remand to correct the finding.8'
In Bonus Stores, Inc. v. Hensley,82 the claimant sustained a compensable back injury in March 2002, received temporary total disability
benefits until November 2003, and then received temporary partial
disability benefits through November 2008.83 The claimant subsequently requested his injury be deemed "catastrophic," and the ALJ concluded

73.

Id. at 810, 709 S.E.2d at 396.

74. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
75. Id. at 805-06, 703 S.E.2d at 393-94.
76. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-103(a) (1998).
77. Home Depot, 306 Ga. App. at 806-07, 703 S.E.2d at 394-95.
78. Id. at 808, 703 S.E.2d at 395.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 809, 703 S.E.2d at 395 (quoting Gill v. Prehistoric Ponds, 280 Ga. App. 629,
629, 634 S.E.2d 769, 770 (2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
81. Id. at 810, 703 S.E.2d at 396.
82. 309 Ga. App. 129, 710 S.E.2d 201 (2011).
83. Id. at 129, 710 S.E.2d at 202.
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The appellate division allotted greater
the injury was catastrophic.'
weight to the opinion of the doctors put forth by the employer and
vacated the award, denying the claimant's request. The Superior Court
of Greene County, Georgia, held that the appellate division incorrectly
used a de novo standard of review and should have upheld the ALJ's
findings and award based on the evidence."
On appeal, the court stated that, though the appellate division is
limited to the evidence heard by the AM, it still "must weigh the
evidence[,] .

..

assess the credibility of [the] witnesses," and determine

whether the ALJ's findings were supported by a preponderance of the
evidence." Therefore, if the ALJ's findings were not supported by a
preponderance of the evidence, then the appellate division could
substitute its own factual findings for those of the ALJ, and the superior
court erred in ruling otherwise."
The court then addressed the employer/insurer's argument that the
appellate division's holding was supported by a preponderance of the
evidence and that the superior court, therefore, erred in reversing.8
The court of appeals affirmed that the superior court is more limited in
its appellate review than the appellate division because, if the factual
findings of the appellate division are supported by any evidence, they are
conclusive and binding." Therefore, because the appellate division's
findings were supported by some evidence, the superior court should not
have substituted its judgment for the lawful judgment provided by the
appellate division.o
In Georgia Mountain Excavation, Inc. v. Dobbins," the claimant
alleged to have sustained injuries on the job on several different
occasions. He injured his back in February 2007 while lifting his toolbox
from his truck, missed one month of work, and received benefits. He
injured himself again three months later and received medical treatment. Finally, he allegedly injured his back on November 25, 2008,
though the parties disputed whether or when the claimant provided
notice to the employer of his third injury. Eventually, the employer fired
the claimant after finding no coworkers who could corroborate whether

84. Id. at 129-30, 710 S.E.2d at 202-03.
85. Id. at 131, 710 S.E.2d at 203.
86. Id. at 131-32, 710 S.E.2d at 204 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Home Depot, 306 Ga.
App. at 806, 703 S.E.2d at 394).
87. Id. at 132, 710 S.E.2d at 204.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 133, 710 S.E.2d at 205.
91. 309 Ga. App. 155, 710 S.E.2d 205 (2011).
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the accident occurred. The AJ awarded the claimant temporary total
disability benefits.9 2
The appellate division determined the evidence did not support the
ALJ's determination that a compensable injury occurred. The Superior
Court of Fannin County, Georgia, concluded that the evidence did not
support the appellate division's decision and reinstated the ALJ's award
of benefits."
The court of appeals concluded the superior court had simply
disagreed with the factual findings of the appellate division.94 However, the superior court must defer to the appellate division's factual
findings so long as they are supported by evidence." Because the
record contained some competent evidence that supported the findings
of the appellate division, the superior court erred in reversing." The
Superior Court of Carroll County, Georgia did not have the authority to
substitute its own findings for those of the appellate division."
In McEwen v. Bremen Bowdon Investment Co.," the claimant
experienced back pain while working. While both parties acknowledged
that the claimant told her supervisor her back was hurting, the parties
disputed whether the employer was informed that the pain was allegedly
a result of her work. The claimant subsequently missed work because
of her pain, and the employer fired her for absenteeism. When the
claimant requested disability benefits and medical treatment, the ALJ
determined that the back injury was compensable, as the injury was a
product of her employment, and awarded temporary total disability and
medical benefits. The appellate division reversed, based in part on the
claimant's admission that she never alleged a job-related injury, and the
superior court affirmed."
The court of appeals determined that, while the appellate division may
substitute its own factual findings for those of the ALJ, here, the
appellate division based its decision on an erroneous finding of fact,
namely that the employee admitted she did not allege a job-related
injury.'o In fact, this supposed admission of the claimant was not in
the record, and the appellate division did not base its award on a
determination that one witness-testifying regarding the allegations of

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id. at 155-57, 710 S.E.2d at 205-07.
Id. at 157, 710 S.E.2d at 207.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
309 Ga. App. 170, 709 S.E.2d 908 (2011).
Id. at 170-71, 709 S.E.2d at 909.
Id. at 171, 709 S.E.2d at 909.
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a job-related injury-was more credible than another."o' Because this
admission was never made in the record, and because it was unclear
whether the appellate division had considered all of the evidence, the
10 2
case was remanded to the board for additional consideration.
CHANGE IN CONDITION
In Master Craft Flooring v. Dunham,0 ' the claimant sustained a
compensable neck injury in November 2004, missed six weeks, and then
returned to light-duty work. He sustained a second work-related neck
injury in May 2007, resigned his employment, and began working for
another employer. Following a hearing, the ALJ ruled that the 2007
injury was a compensable aggravation of the 2004 injury. The ALJ
found the claimant was entitled to medical treatment for the duration
of the aggravation and temporary total disability benefits for the brief
period the claimant was held out of work by his doctor. The ALJ also
found that the resignation was voluntary and unrelated to any neck
injury. The appellate division affirmed.104
The claimant filed another hearing request in 2008, arguing that he
sustained an economic change in condition when he was laid off by his
subsequent employer in January 2008 and was unable to find employment elsewhere due to his aggravated injury. The claimant sought
disability benefits as of June 2008. The ALJ found that the claimant
sustained a change in condition for the worse when laid off from the
second employer in January 2008, he still had limitations resulting from
the 2007 aggravation, and he conducted a diligent job search but was
denied employment due to his injury. Based on video surveillance
showing the claimant working without limitation a year after the layoff,
the ALJ determined the claimant's condition had changed for the better
and awarded temporary total disability benefits from January 2008
VI.

through March 2009.10o

The appellate division concluded that the ALJ's findings were not
supported by a preponderance of the evidence and, instead, focused on
the contradiction between the claimant's testimony and other evidence,
including the video surveillance, the subsequent employer's testimony
indicating no knowledge of any work restrictions, no change in restrictions from the 2004 injury, and ambiguous medical records. The

101. Id.
102. Id. at 171, 709 S.E.2d at 909-10 (quoting Times-Georgian v. Thompson, 201 Ga.
App. 854, 856, 412 S.E.2d 871, 874 (1991)).
103. 308 Ga. App. 430, 708 S.E.2d 36 (2011).
104. Id. at 430-31, 708 S.E.2d at 37-38.
105. Id. at 430-32, 708 S.E.2d at 38.
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appellate division determined the 2007 neck injury had returned to the
preaggravation baseline. The Superior Court of Glynn County, Georgia,
reversed the appellate division on grounds that the ALJ's award was
supported by a preponderance of the evidence.1 06
The court of appeals recited the law governing a request for an
economic change in condition, stating that the claimant must prove "a
loss of earning power as a result of a compensable work-related injury;
continue[d] ... physical limitations attributable to that injury; and ...
a diligent, but unsuccessful effort to secure suitable employment
following termination."o' The ALJ may then draw reasonable inferences that the inability to find suitable employment was proximately
caused by the ongoing disability.0 s The court also noted the appellate
division's purview in assessing credibility, weighing evidence, and
drawing its own factual conclusions. 09 In contrast, the subsequent
appellate courts must evaluate whether the appellate division's findings
are supported by any evidence.no With the issues so framed, the court
of appeals held that the superior court erred in reversing because there
was evidence in the record to support the appellate division's award."'
In Veolia Environmental Services v. Vick," 2 the court of appeals
addressed the burden of proof in a change in condition case where the
claimant received temporary partial disability benefits before his forcause termination but thereafter sought temporary total disability
benefits. The claimant, an equipment operator, signed the employer's
drug and alcohol policy when hired, which included a requirement that
an employee report the use of prescription medications to a supervisor.
The claimant sustained a compensable injury in April 2007 and received
indemnity benefits until he returned to work two months later. In
March 2008, the claimant's doctor prescribed him morphine and, soon
after, a coworker informed the employer that claimant was working
while under the influence. Pursuant to the drug policy signed by the
claimant, the employer asked the claimant not to return until he had a
clearance letter from his doctor and, when the claimant failed to do so,
the employer fired him."'

106. Id. at 432-33, 708 S.E.2d at 38-39.
107. Id. at 433, 708 S.E.2d at 39 (quoting Maloney v. Gordon Cnty. Farms, 265 Ga. 825,
828, 462 S.E.2d 606, 608-09 (1995)).
108. Id. (quoting Maloney, 265 Ga. at 828, 462 S.E.2d at 609).
109. Id. at 433-34, 708 S.E.2d at 39 (quoting Lowndes Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs v. Connell,
305 Ga. App. 844, 844, 701 S.E.2d 227, 228 (2010)).
110. Id. at 434, 708 S.E.2d at 40.
111. Id. at 434, 708 S.E.2d at 40-41.
112. 309 Ga. App. 658, 711 S.E.2d 40 (2011).
113. Id. at 658-59, 711 S.E.2d at 41.
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The ALJ denied the claimant's request for temporary total disability
benefits since his last day of work, finding he did not make a diligent job
search, but awarded temporary partial disability benefits for the period
of time the claimant was on restricted duty work, June 2007 through
March 2008, and continuing after his last day of work because the
employer/insurer failed to prove a change in condition for the better.
The appellate division vacated the award of temporary partial disability
benefits subsequent to March 2008. The Superior Court of Lowndes
County, Georgia, remanded the case to the appellate division so it could
place the burden of proof on the employer/insurer to show the claimant
was not entitled to temporary partial disability benefits after March
2008. 114
The court of appeals held that the superior court erred in placing the
burden of proof on the employer/insurer to show the claimant was not
The employer/insurer did not
entitled to benefits post-termination.'
claim any change of condition since the day of termination, but rather
the claimant requested temporary partial disability benefits while on
restricted duty and temporary total disability benefits since he was
fired."' Thus, the claimant properly bore the burden to show his
entitlement to the temporary total disability benefits requested by him
after termination."' The court noted that once an employee is terminated for cause, the employee carries the burden of proving he cannot
secure suitable employment elsewhere as a result of his previous
Here, the ALJ found he had not made a diligent search for
injury.'
employment."' Therefore, the shifting of the burden onto the employer/insurer was improper and reversible error.120
VII.

RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT

In City of Atlanta v. Holder,12 ' the Georgia Court of Appeals revisited a case with a long procedural history stemming from the mistaken
issuance of two awards from one settlement. The claimant in Holder, an
Atlanta police officer for over twenty-four years, sustained numerous
injuries during his employment, including a head and neck injury on

114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. at 659, 711 S.E.2d at 41.
Id.
Id. at 659, 711 S.E.2d at 42.
Id. at 660, 711 S.E.2d at 42.

118.

Id. (quoting Gilbert/Robinson, Inc. v. Meyers, 214 Ga. App. 510, 511, 488 S.E.2d

246, 247 (1994)).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. 309 Ga. App. 811, 711 S.E.2d 332 (2011).
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January 16, 1993.122 The claimant entered into and signed a "Stipulation and Agreement" with the employer/insurer on November 14, 2006,
which listed fifteen dates of accident including January 6, 1993, but not
the January 16, 1993, accident date.'" However, there was language
in which the parties agree that there have been no other accidents
except those stated in the agreement. The state board approved the
stipulation on January 23, 2007, and the employer/insurer subsequently
issued payment. 124 There was also a second "Stipulation and Agreement," which was primarily identical to the first, but it listed the
January 16, 1993, injury in place of the fifteen other incidents. 12s The
second agreement was approved by the board on January 25, 2007. The
claimant argued that he should also have been paid for this second
agreement. 126
After the claimant filed a demand for judgment on the second
stipulation, which was denied by the Superior Court of Fulton County,
Georgia and, in turn, reversed by the court of appeals,1 27 the superior
court entered an order granting the demand for judgment such that the
employer/insurer were liable to pay under the second award as well. 128
The employer/insurer moved to set aside the judgment, including an
affidavit from the board's former director of the settlement division
attesting that the board made an internal mistake in issuing the second
award. The motion was never addressed by the ALJ, and the claimant
moved to enforce the judgment, after which the superior court granted
claimant's motion but denied the motion to set aside.129
On appeal, the court agreed that the superior court erred in denying
the motion to set aside because the claimant did not enter any evidence
to rebut the evidence presented by the employer/insurer in its argument
that the second stipulation was purely the result of a mistake. 3 0
Thus, the only evidence presented showed the claimant was not entitled
to a second payment for the same injuries. 31 The court determined
that it was the superior court, not the employer/insurer, who was at
fault for the lack of an appeal of the award on the second stipulation

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
S.E.2d
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id. at 811, 711 S.E.2d at 334.
Id.
Id. at 811-12, 711 S.E.2d at 334.
Id. at 812, 711 S.E.2d at 334.
Id.
Id. at 813, 711 S.E.2d at 335; Holder v. City of Atlanta, 294 Ga. App. 568, 669
504 (2008).
Holder, 309 Ga. App. at 813, 711 S.E.2d at 335.
Id. at 813-14, 711 S.E.2d at 335-36.
Id. at 814-15, 711 S.E.2d at 336.
Id. at 815, 711 S.E.2d at 336.
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because the superior court failed to issue a timely order on the initial
appeal.132 Additionally, the court held that the employer/insurer was not
barred by res judicata because the prior appeals focused on the narrow
issue of the superior court's failure to enter an order within the time
allowed by law, and the issue of fraud or mistake was not previously
litigated on the merits.' 3 Therefore, the previous orders were open to
a motion to set aside and, because the unrebutted evidence showed the
second stipulation was entered due to a mistake, the superior court
should have set aside the judgment.'
VIII.

SUBROGATION

In Austell Healthcare,Inc. v. Scott,"' the claimant was injured in a
motor vehicle accident while on the job. The claimant sued several
parties allegedly responsible for the crash, in addition to receiving
workers' compensation benefits. The employer/insurer filed a subrogation lien to recover benefits and medical expenses paid. The trial court
granted the employer/insurer's motion to intervene in the lawsuit and
denied their motion requesting they be allowed to participate in
discovery."
Eventually, the claimant settled his lawsuit and filed a
motion to quash the employer/insurer's lien on grounds that he had not
been fully compensated, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11.1(b), ' as
required by Georgia law.'
The trial court granted the claimant's
motion to extinguish the subrogation lien because the employer/insurer
could not prove the employee had been fully compensated upon the
receipt of the lump sum settlement."' The court also ordered the
employer/insurer to pay attorney fees. 4 0
The court of appeals agreed that the employer/insurer failed to carry
their burden of proof showing the claimant was fully compensated
because they presented no evidence at all on this point.14' The
employer/insurer apparently did not participate in a hearing in the
underlying litigation, so there was no record for the court to review.142

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
11.1(b).
139.
140.
141.
142.

Id. at 815, 711 S.E.2d at 336-37.
Id. at 816, 711 S.E.2d at 337.
Id.
308 Ga. App. 393, 707 S.E.2d 599 (2011).
Id. at 393-94, 707 S.E.2d at 600-01.
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11.1(b) (2008).
Austell Healthcare,Inc., 308 Ga. App. at 394, 707 S.E.2d at 601; O.C.G.A. § 34-9Austell Healthcare, Inc., 308 Ga. App. at 394, 707 S.E.2d at 601.
Id.
Id. at 394-95, 707 S.E.2d at 601.
Id. at 395, 707 S.E.2d at 601.
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The employer/insurer did not proffer sufficient evidence that the
claimant was fully compensated and did not show that the trial court
refused to consider such evidence.14 1
The court found no merit in the argument that the trial court failed
to hold a requisite evidentiary hearing and noted that the employer/insurer did not present evidence from the court's hearing on the
motion to quash the lien.144 The court of appeals determined that the
trial court's refusal to allow the employer/insurer to participate in
discovery was not reversible error because the employer/insurer did not
point to any pertinent evidence that was not produced during discov-

ery.145
The court agreed that granting attorney fees was an abuse of
discretion. 141 Where an employer/insurer intervenes in a claimant's
suit against a third-party tortfeasor, after the claimant has settled or
obtained a favorable verdict, "it is the trial court's duty to consider
evidence and determine whether the [claimant] has been fully and
completely compensated."147 The trial court abused its discretion by
allowing a lien viability hearing "only after a liability award" and then
sanctioning the employer/insurer for the refusal to withdraw the
lien. 148

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

395, 707 S.E.2d at 602.
396, 707 S.E.2d at 602.
396, 707 S.E.2d at 602-03.
396, 707 S.E.2d at 602.
396, 707 S.E.2d at 603 (internal quotation marks omitted).

